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The cases grouped in the concluding chapter deal with questions of administrative procedure, of methods of review and of notice and hearing, topics often
excluded from academic consideration. The subject of notice and hearing,
however, deserves more prominent treatment than is accorded it. Significantly,
the Johnson Act of 1934, which limits the original jurisdiction of the Federal
District Courts in respect to administrative rate orders, has no application
unless the challenged rate order "has been made after reasonable notice and
hearing." But what constitutes an adequate administrative hearing within the
meaning of the Johnson Act, or of other statutory enactments, or under the
due process clause of State and Federal Constitutions, where the validity of
administrative action is in question?
The Courts have yet to give an authoritative answer with respect to this
provision of the Johnson Act. But they have given some indication of their
views with respect to other statutory provisions and the judicial requirements
under the due process clause.
These important cases are missing from the
otherwise comprehensive list of cases and may well be grouped together under
the heading of Notice ana Hearing, with special emphasis on the requirements
of the statute and of due process to render the hearing adequate and the resulting administrative action valid.
Considering the high scholarly attainments and previous contributions of
the authors, a first-class piece of work was naturally to be expected from their
joint authorship. The new edition fulfils this expectation.
PINcus M. BERxsoN.

CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YoRI PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

By Louis Prashker 1
1937, pp. lviii, 1431.

Second edition.

Brooklyn: St. John's University School of Law,

The law of pleading and practice is ever in flux. Therefore, one who
labors on a case book on this subject, ventures upon a task made doubly difficult
by the uncertainty of his materials. Not only is he uncertain as to the permanency of his contribution, but he must have considerable doubt of his decisions
as to what materials should be included, which should be emphasized, and how
recent developments should be illustrated.
Thus, proper orientation, in a field governed by expediency, but expressed
in terms of logic, is no mean attainment; and an author of a work on pleading
and practice is, therefore, peculiarly in a position to appreciate the horrors of
I Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1935) (reported
after publication of new edition) ; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U. S. 63, 55 Sup. Ct. 316 (1934); Panama Refining
Company v. Ryan, 293. U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935) ; Atchison Ry. Co. v.
United States, 284 U. S. 248, 52 Sup. Ct. 146 (1931) ; Northern Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39, 45 Sup. Ct. 412 (1925); Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 13 F. Supp. 931 (N. D. Cal. 1936).
'Professor

of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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a Damocles' sword hanging over his head-resulting from the very nature of
the effort in which he is engaged-and the "stab under the fifth rib," which is
the reward of all writers of books.
Unfortunately, the sword of Damocles cannot be cut down from over the
author's head. He who writes on practice-while the Judicial Council, Law
Revision Commission, Commission on Administration of Justice, and the Legislature grind their grist-must always remain under such a threat. Even while
he writes, basic revisions of statutory law are being considered. But the author
need have no fear of any stab thrust. Mr. Prashker's book reaches that state
of excellence which makes it proof against any such attack. It is the finest
piece of masterly scholarship, in the field of pleading and practice case books,
which has, in many years, come to attention. It shows, not only untold
industry and painstaking investigation, but, also, a scholarship which is profound, and an appreciation of the nuances of the subject, which is given only to
those who are in tune with their task, enjoy it; and understand it.
Such being the conclusion, one may well appreciate that, as one reads the
book, the critical approach becomes converted into admiration. So much so,
that the temptation-to which most reviewers succumb-of using a book review
as a vehicle for a commentary-is not even present. After all, what difference
does it make that there may be dissent from one view or another? Yet, duty
had to be and must be done. Therefore, of the succeeding comments, not all
are favorable, but what there is of such comment weighs but little in the
balance.
The book is entitled "Cases and Materials on New York Pleading and
Practice." It is more than that. It is an experienced teacher's notebook of
cases, statutory material, forms, essays of others, queries which have suggested
themselves to the author, and his own commentaries on important topics.
The cases are selected with care, and in full deference to the lessons of
experience. The author has taken advantage of all the assistance which he
could obtain. For the most part, his treatment is progressive, rather than
controversial. By that, is meant that he develops the principles involved,
rather than poses problems to be solved. Yet, this procedure is followed with
no undue devotion to a mere theory of compilation. Wherever the subject
matter deserves or requires it, there is ample contrast, comparison, and thoughtprovoking presentation. Cases are selected for their aptitude in developing the
basic principles involved, and not merely for their date of utterance; yet, important recent cases, which have the necessary content, appear in considerable
number. Of these, Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270
N. Y. 287, 200 N. E. 824 (1936) ; PrudentialInsurance Company of America v.
Stone, 270 N. Y. 154, 200 N. E. 679 (1936); Chase National Bank of City of
New York v. Turnter, 269 N. Y. 397, 199 N. E. 636 (1936); Rawstone v.
Maguire, 265 N. Y. 204, 192 N. E. 294 (1934) ; Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N. Y.
484, 1 N. E. (2d) 975 (1936) ; Romano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 271 N. Y.
288, 2 N. E. (2d) 661 (1936) ; Schaffer v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 269
N. Y. 336, 199 N. &_ 503 (1936) ; Cotnareaum v. Chase National Banik, 271
N. Y. 294, 2 N. E. (2d) 664 (1936) ; McGowan v. Eastman, 271 N. Y. 195, 2
N. E. (2d) 625 (1936), are convenient examples. Nor is the compilation too
narrow for scholarly approach. Where a discussion, in a case of a court,
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other than New York, is helpful, that appears as well. Cf. Jellife v. Thaw, 67
F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
There may be reasonable disagreement with the order of presentation in
the development of the field. Thus it would seem that the subject of Statutes
of Limitation, particularly in connection with the problems of the law and
equity phases of the single civil action, should better have been postponed until
after the treatment of that topic. Similarly, from the functional point of view,
it would have been better to develop the topics of the "Courts and Their Jurisdiction"; "Parties to Actions"; "Election of Remedies"; "Splitting Causes of
Action," and, then, the "Complaint," in that order, rather than as done by the
author, because such is the order of thought which must be followed by the
practicing lawyer, in formulating his complaint and determining his policy.
To consider "Election of Remedies" and "Splitting Causes of Action," as a
problem of defense-as is indicated by the author's grouping of them, under
the general heading "The Answer"--seems to be a reversal of the ordinary
routine of things, characteristic rather of the plaintiff's lawyer who first draws
his complaint, and looks up his law afterwards, than of the attorney who faces
his problems in proper sequence.
For the most part, the statutory material is set forth in the footnotes. In
some instances, there are only references. It would have been better to have
presented the statutes as part of the main text, and, in all cases, to have set
them forth in full. The reason is twofold: First, ease of reading is an
important consideration; second, the psychology of the student should be so
directed that, as he studies the subject, it is forced into his consciousness that
the statutes constitute, not merely auxiliary sources, but the basic foundation
of procedural law.
An interesting feature of the book consists of its many references to essays
and commentaries of writers on the law, and, in a large number of instances,
its reproduction of portions of such legal studies. This procedure undoubtedly
has the advantage of stimulating independent thinking, and of conditioning
students to appreciation of legal contributions of academic nature. Thus, is
opened up the field of abstract legal scholarship, which experience teaches is a
valuable, and even indispensable, condition precedent to the so-called practical
point of view.
At appropriate plaqes throughout the book, the author has incorporated
some of the features of a law-quizzer. This, he has accomplished by formulating questions arising out of the subject matter of the cases presented. The
device seems to be well adapted towards stimulating thought in advance of
classroom discussion, and organizing it so that the classroom work itself
becomes more efficient. If such questions are used as a basis for discussion,
they should produce better cooperation from that small portion of each class
which is adequately prepared by complete familiarity with the reading matter
available to it.
In his preface, the author states: "I have included introductory and expository notes in addition to selected and digested cases. For a number of years, I
have increasingly felt that in a law course on practice, the use of cases exclusively is inexpedient. Many details must be noted-but sound educational principles do not require that students should labor through case material for
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details." Therefore, the author has included extended notes on many topics, of
which the following are illustrative: "Jurisdiction; Service by Publication;
Service on Motorists; Federal Interpleader Legislation; Limitation of Actions."
Quite uniformly, throughout the book, there are interspersed introductory notes
and running comment. This is the feature of the work which gives it its
character as a lecturer's notebook, for much of this material is not mere
"detail," but comment, analysis, and exposition, which characterize the usual
law school lecture. The material is valuable, but imparts a text-book character
to much of the case book-which, at least, creates a doubt as to whether the
student who has carefully studied his book, will not be deprived of something
of that classroom stimulation which comes from first impressions, incident to
classroom discussion, and whether the instructor has not, too early in the
process, given the student the answer book to many of the problems which, for
his own good, should perplex him for a considerable time.
On the subject of forms, the author has made contribution only to the
extent of illustration of the usual and simple papers. As a means of aiding
comprehension, they have been well selected and carefully presented.
Throughout the book, there is repeated evidence of authorship which is
keenly alive to newer developments. The usual treatment of joinder of causes
of action and interposition of counterclaims, is omitted, by reason of recent
changes in our procedure. The treatment of the problems of vouching in
parties, under Subdivision 2 of Section 193 of the Civil Practice Act, is impressively up to the minute. There is a presentation of the recent legislation on
injunctions and labor disputes. In connection with the discussion of the summons, there is reference to the case of People v. Globe Jewelers, Inc., 249 App.
Div. 122, 291 N. Y. Supp. 362 (1936), holding that it is a violation of the Penal
Law to use a summons for merely commercial purposes, which introduces an
ethical element well worth impressing upon the student. There is an adequate
treatment of the subject of declaratory judgments and proceedings supplementary to judgment, as well as of the special proceedings. While the discussion of
appellate practice is very sketchy, nevertheless it is sufficient as an introduction
to the beginner.
When everything is said and done, Mr. Prashker's work is so deserving of
praise, that, what little criticism there may be, is of no material consequence.
As far as the reviewer is concerned, if he were teaching pleading and practice,
and faced with the necessity of selecting a case book, he would have no hesitation in choosing Mr. Prashker's book as the best current book now available
on the subject.
JAY LEo RoTHscHIL.*

TAXABLE INcom.
pp. ix, 437.

By Roswell Magill.

New York: The Ronald Press, 1936,

The income tax law presents two fundamental problems. The first is concerned with the question, "What is income"; the second, with the determination of when income is taxable.
*Former Professor of Pleading and Practice, Brooklyn Law School;
member of the New York Bar.

